How to read this page
- Established lawWhat legislation, treaties and courts have actually established.
- Relevant case lawDecisions providing relevant principles or potentially analogous reasoning.
- Legal argument (FFVR)FFVR's interpretation of how the principles may apply to vegan dietary requests.
- FFVR policy positionWhat FFVR advocates for as a future development of Swedish law.
1. The text of Article 9
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes … freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”
Article 9(1), European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No 005). Interferences may be limited only under Article 9(2), that is, by measures prescribed by law, pursuing a legitimate aim and necessary in a democratic society.
2. Ethical veganism is a protected belief
A non-religious conviction falls within Article 9 where it attains a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance: Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom (App Nos 7511/76 and 7743/76, 25 February 1982, § 36).
- Cogency — the conviction is intelligible and coherent as a position on the treatment of animals.
- Seriousness — it is genuinely and consistently held, not a passing preference.
- Cohesion — it forms part of a structured worldview governing everyday conduct.
- Importance — it concerns a weighty aspect of human life and conduct.
This threshold was applied to ethical veganism by the European Court of Human Rights in G.K. and A.S. v Switzerland (App Nos 55299/20 and 31515/22, Chamber judgment of 16 July 2026 — not yet final), where the Court accepted that the applicants' ethical convictions met the required threshold and found that the Swiss authorities' overly formalistic handling of their requests for a vegan diet violated Article 9 and Article 13 taken together with Article 9.
This judgment does not establish an unconditional right to vegan food in every public-sector setting. Its broader relevance to other public-sector contexts is a matter of legal interpretation and has not been generally established by Swedish case law.
3. Diet as a manifestation of belief
Article 9 protects not only holding a belief but manifesting it in practice. Adherence to dietary rules is a direct expression of belief: Jakóbski v Poland (App No 18429/06, 7 December 2010, §§ 45–55); Vartic v Romania (No 2) (App No 14150/08, 17 December 2013, §§ 47–51). For an ethical vegan, abstention from all food of animal origin is not a preference about taste but the daily and non-negotiable practice of the belief itself.
4. Positive obligations where the State controls the meal
Article 9 is not merely a prohibition on interference. Where an individual is dependent on a public institution for food — in detention, compulsory care, or compulsory schooling — the State must take reasonable steps to enable the manifestation of belief. In Jakóbski the Court found a violation because the authorities refused a meat-free diet without any assessment of the practical difficulties involved. The failure to weigh the burden, rather than the burden itself, was decisive.
G.K. and A.S. v Switzerland concerned non-religious ethical convictions in detention and in psychiatric care, and adds a procedural dimension: the Court found a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 9 because the domestic remedies were, in the circumstances, not effective in practice. Article 9 may impose positive obligations on States in certain circumstances; it does not require States to provide vegan food in all situations.
5. Article 14: equal treatment of comparable diets
Article 14 has no independent existence: it may become relevant where differential treatment concerns a right falling within the scope of another Convention provision, such as Article 9. Public institutions routinely provide halal, kosher, gluten-free and medically indicated diets. FFVR argues that providing those while refusing an equivalent vegan diet can support an argument of differential treatment of persons in relevantly similar situations, which would then require objective and reasonable justification. A refusal of a vegan meal does not automatically constitute discrimination under Article 14; the comparison, the scope question and the justification must each be assessed on the facts.
6. Proportionality
Where a request engages Article 9, a refusal is assessed for proportionality. The assessment may involve the legitimate aim pursued by the institution; whether the measure is suitable to achieve that aim; whether it is necessary; whether less restrictive alternatives exist, such as a standing plant-based option or an adapted portion; proportionality in the strict sense, weighing the burden on the institution against the significance of the conviction for the individual; the interests and rights of the individual, including dependency on the institution; and the practical circumstances of the institution, such as kitchen capacity, procurement contracts and nutritional requirements.
Proportionality does not automatically require an authority to grant every dietary request. What the case law does indicate is that a refusal reached without any genuine assessment is vulnerable to challenge.
7. FFVR's recommended approach
The following are FFVR recommendations based on the legal analysis above, not a statement of binding legal requirements applicable in every case.
- A request for a vegan meal should be received, registered and examined on its substance rather than dismissed as a matter of taste.
- Any refusal should be reasoned and individual, and should show that the actual operational burden was assessed.
- The decision should be capable of review through an accessible domestic remedy.
- Where a vegan meal is provided, FFVR recommends that it be nutritionally adequate rather than the standard meal with animal products removed.
8. Sector by sector
Schools and preschools
Attendance is compulsory and the meal is provided by the State. FFVR argues that a refusal without individual assessment can condition access to education on acting against one's convictions, and that this can support an argument under Article 9 read with Article 2 of Protocol No 1 and Article 14. This has not been established as a general right under Swedish case law.
Hospitals and psychiatric care
Patients, and in particular those under compulsory care, depend on the institution for food. In G.K. and A.S. v Switzerland (Chamber judgment, not yet final) the Court found that overly formalistic handling of such a request violated Article 9 and Article 13 taken together with Article 9. FFVR considers that this supports an argument that requests should be examined on their merits.
Elderly and residential care
Residents often have no practical alternative source of meals. FFVR argues that the reasoning on positive obligations developed in the detention cases may be relevant by analogy, together with the dignity dimension of Article 8. The Court has not ruled on residential care in this context.
Prisons and detention
This is where the case law is strongest. In Jakóbski v Poland (religious conviction) and Vartic v Romania (No 2) the Court found violations of Article 9 where a conviction-based diet was refused without any assessment of the practical burden. Rule 22 of the Nelson Mandela Rules requires nutritionally adequate food. These cases do not establish that any particular diet must always be provided.
Universities and public canteens
Where a public body procures or operates catering, FFVR argues that the design of the menu may raise Article 9 considerations and that Directive 2014/24/EU permits award criteria that secure an adequate vegan option. Attendance is not compulsory here, which weakens the analogy with closed institutions.
Armed forces and other closed institutions
FFVR argues that the same control-and-dependency reasoning may apply wherever the State restricts an individual's ability to obtain food independently. Whether it does so in a given setting is a question of interpretation.
FFVR's policy position
Sources cited
- European Convention on Human Rights, Articles 9, 13 and 14
- Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom (App Nos 7511/76 and 7743/76, 25 February 1982)
- Jakóbski v Poland (App No 18429/06, 7 December 2010)
- Vartic v Romania (No 2) (App No 14150/08, 17 December 2013)
- G.K. and A.S. v Switzerland (App Nos 55299/20 and 31515/22, 16 July 2026)
- UN Nelson Mandela Rules, rule 22
- Livsmedelsverket — vegan diets
The information provided by FFVR is intended for general informational and educational purposes. It is not individual legal advice. The legal analysis presented on this website includes both established law and FFVR's interpretation of relevant legal principles. Where FFVR advocates for a particular legal development, this should not be understood as a statement that such a right already exists under Swedish law.