Chapter I · European Convention on Human Rights

Article 9 and Article 14 ECHR

Article 9(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees to everyone the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The provision protects not only religious belief but also non-religious philosophical convictions of sufficient cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance (see Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom, App No 7511/76, judgment of 25 February 1982, § 36).

1. Ethical veganism as a protected belief

The threshold for a non-religious conviction to fall within Article 9 is well established in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights: the belief must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. That standard was originally articulated in Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom (App Nos 7511/76 and 7743/76, judgment of 25 February 1982, § 36). That test was applied to ethical veganism by the European Court of Human Rights in G.K. and A.S. v Switzerland (Chamber judgment, not yet final), where the Court observed that veganism is regarded by Council of Europe member States as a non-religious belief and accepted that the applicants' convictions met the required threshold. Whether a particular individual's conviction meets the threshold remains a question to be assessed on the facts.

2. Positive obligations in institutional settings

Where the State exercises custody or control over an individual — detention, compulsory schooling, hospital care — the Court has recognised positive obligations under Article 9. In Jakóbski v Poland (App No 18429/06, judgment of 7 December 2010) the Court held that the refusal of prison authorities to provide a Buddhist prisoner with a meat-free diet, without any assessment of the practical difficulties, violated Article 9. The applicant's conviction was religious rather than an ethical vegan conviction, so the case is not a direct vegan-rights precedent. FFVR argues that its reasoning — that adherence to dietary rules can be a direct expression of belief in practice, and that the practical burden must be genuinely assessed — is relevant by analogy to ethical vegans.

3. G.K. and A.S. v Switzerland (Chamber judgment of 16 July 2026 — not yet final)

In G.K. and A.S. v Switzerland (App Nos 55299/20 and 31515/22, Chamber judgment of 16 July 2026 — not yet final) the Fifth Section addressed, for the first time in a judgment on the merits, the position of ethical vegans deprived of liberty. The first applicant was held in pre-trial detention at Champ-Dollon Prison in Geneva; the second was confined in the psychiatric unit of a cantonal hospital. Neither obtained a fully vegan diet, and neither obtained a substantive examination of his complaint before the domestic authorities.

The Court observed that veganism is considered by Council of Europe member States as a non-religious belief, and found that the applicants' convictions were sincere and consistent, that a sufficiently close connection existed between those convictions and their abstention from food of animal origin, and that their beliefs accordingly met the required level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance to fall within the scope of Article 9. Article 13 was therefore applicable in conjunction with Article 9.

On the merits, the Court criticised the excessively formalistic approach of the administrative and judicial authorities: the applicants were in practice unable to obtain the administrative decisions required for their Article 9 claims to be examined, being considered to lack a sufficient legal interest under the applicable law. The remedies were therefore ineffective in practice. The Court further held that Article 9 imposed a positive obligation to address the applicants' requests in substance, and that the domestic authorities had failed to strike a fair balance between the competing interests at stake.

The Court found, by six votes to one, a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 9 and a violation of Article 9, and awarded EUR 12,000 and EUR 4,000 respectively in non-pecuniary damage, together with EUR 10,000 in costs to the second applicant. Judge Grigoryan appended a declaration of dissent. The judgment concerns the handling of requests for a vegan diet in detention and in involuntary psychiatric care.

This judgment does not establish an unconditional right to vegan food in every public-sector setting. Its broader relevance to other public-sector contexts — schools, elderly care, universities — is a matter of legal interpretation and has not been generally established by Swedish case law. FFVR argues that the reasoning may have relevance beyond the specific circumstances of the judgment.

Full text of the judgment (HUDOC)

4. Discrimination under Article 14

Article 14 has no independent existence. It may become relevant where differential treatment concerns a right falling within the scope of another Convention provision, such as Article 9. Where the State provides food to persons in comparable situations (for instance, pupils at a public school), FFVR argues that leaving ethical vegans without an adequate option can support an argument of differential treatment requiring objective and reasonable justification. A refusal does not automatically constitute discrimination under Article 14; comparability, scope and justification must each be assessed on the facts.

5. Margin of appreciation

The margin of appreciation is narrow where the alleged interference touches the core of freedom of conscience and the individual is under the effective control of the State (see Vartic v Romania (No 2), App No 14150/08, judgment of 17 December 2013, §§ 47–53).